

**OPORD XX/20XX: UNAC OP ORDER****(UN Confidential)**

Copy No ____ of ____

FWD HQ UNAC

GALASI, PROVINCE of FELLARI, CARANA

151030C AUG XXX

OP O 01/XXXX

Refs:

A. CARANA Study, geographic and provincial maps

B. UNSC RESOLUTION, 22 JUL XXXX.

C. Mission Concept of Ops dated...

D. DPKO Military Strategic Concept of Operations

E. ROE dated.....

F. SOFA dated

Time Z: CHARLIE

Task Organization: See Annex A

1. **SITUATION**

- a. **General.** CARANA has experienced internal conflict for over ten years. By 20XX, the central government authority was in danger of collapse and the traditional clan structures, supported by neighbouring countries and using violence against local population had fragmented the country

and condemned thousands of Caranans to death by starvation. Sustained efforts by the 8th Continent Regional Coalition (CRC) finally resulted in the KALARI Treaty reached between the Government of Carana, the Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) and the Independent Combatants du Sud Carana (ICSC). This created the conditions to form a Government of National Reconciliation and hold a general election within 18 months. In the same agreement the Carana Defence Forces (CDF) and the armed components of the MPC and ICSC agreed to a cease-fire. The new government has been formed and plans are underway for elections to be held in 20XX. While the cease-fire is generally holding, tensions between the factions remain high and there is a great deal of suspicion from all sides that the election will not be free or fair.

- b. Despite some International Community Humanitarian relief attempts, the overall situation in CARANA has not improved since May 20XX. It has worsened, especially in the Refugees Camps and has by now reached crisis level. There is an urgent need to act.
- c. The international community has asked the United Nations to intervene with a military force. In view of this situation, the UNSC has adopted a resolution at their 126th meeting in January this year establishing the United Nations Assistance Mission in CARANA (UNAC) for a period of 6 months and further defined that UNAC will consist of up to 6,800 military personnel to address the situation.
- d. Belligerent Forces. The belligerent organisations and capabilities are defined in Annex B INTSUM 01/XX 200900C JUL XX to this OP O. There are two major belligerent groups, the CDF and the MPC. Neither side has the military strength to dominate the country to any extent. These two belligerent groups remain deployed in defensive positions but are capable of limited local offensive actions. A third armed group, the ICSC, is an unstructured formation of rebels. Their capabilities are very limited and generally consist of conducting terrorist like actions against the CDF in the LEPPKO Province and harassing the local population.
 - (1) CDF. The CDF has a strength of approximately 10,000 all ranks. It consists of four “area commands”, all less than brigade strength, and a small air force. The CDF is considered the official armed forces of CARANA. Its equipment has suffered previous years of fighting and is in a poor state of maintenance. Of the 3 areas, the Northern Area headquartered in MARONI is the most effective and the Central Area in FOLSA is the least effective.
 - (2) MPC. The MPC comprises approximately 10,000 personnel of whom approximately half have returned home and, although they have retained their weapons, are currently inactive. The remainder are organized in groups of 750 men and deployed in camps of approximately 250. They are equipped with assault rifles, light mortars and anti-tank weapons. Most of their vehicles are in a poor state of repair with shortages of spares and fuel restricting operations.

- (3) ICSC. The ICSC consists of approximately 2,000 to 3,000 fighters with diverging backgrounds. Some members are deserters from the CDF, while others are from the civil war in Rimoso. The discipline and internal cohesion of this rebel group is low, as is the standard of training. They are notably brutal in combat and show no regard for the rights of non-combatants.

e. Friendly Forces.

- (1) UNSC's Intent. The UNSC intent is to create a secure, stable, democratic and economically sound CARANA thus promoting peace, prosperity and security throughout the region.
- (2) SRSG's Intent. The SRSG wants to quickly establish a secure and stable environment in CARANA by conducting military operations using minimum force, with a view to allowing all the UNAC organizations to provide the urgently needed humanitarian assistance and allow the development of the conditions for the rebuilding of the country, including a general election.
- (3) SRSG's Concept of Operations. In order to implement the UNSC Resolution XXXX, and acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, UNAC is to carry out peacekeeping operations within CARANA. It is to ensure that while doing so it remains an impartial force and is perceived as such by all belligerent parties. It is to do all it can to fulfil its mandate through negotiation and mediation, having gained the consent, trust and co-operation of all the belligerent factions at all levels. Where negotiation has failed, UNAC may take the necessary action, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the Government of the Republic of CARANA.
- (4) UN Components and Agencies in Theatre. The UNAC military force is one of the components available to the Special Representative of the Secretary General/ Head of Mission (SRSG/HoM) in CARANA to achieve the objectives set in the UNSC Resolution. It is a vital component as it provides the overall security and adequate stability for other UN and UN components to complete their role. These other components in CARANA include:
 - (a) Administration office
 - (b) CIVPOL
 - (c) Electoral division
 - (d) Human rights
 - (e) Public Information

- (f) Child protection and education
 - (g) Rule of law
 - (h) DDR
 - (i) Security
- (5) UNHCR will also be present in CARANA. They are the lead agency for the refugee camps outside CARANA and so outside the UNAC mandate.
- (6) The UNAC military forces will operate with UN related organizations, Regional and civilian organizations, International Organizations (IO) and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs). These organizations effort are coordinated by Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In addition, the International Committee of the Red Crystal (ICRC), the World Food Program (WFO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations International Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF) are present in CARANA.
- f. Attachments and Detachments. See UNAC Task Organization Table (Annex A) for all military forces in UNAC.

2. MISSION. UNAC will implement UNSC Resolution (20XX) with a view to creating conditions for a more secure and stable environment in CARANA.

3. EXECUTION.

- a. UNAC Force Commander's intent. Force Commander UNAC's intent is to capitalize on the renewed good will of the belligerents to adhere to the KALARI peace agreement to ensure that their military components do not attempt to delay its implementation. He wishes to quickly establish contacts with all parties and factions involved and develop Sector and local level cooperation based on consensus. The quick UNAC Forces entry in CARANA and the implementation of control measures will create the conditions for the provision of Humanitarian relief and allow all of the UN and UN organizations to achieve their mission and democratize the Country. At the same time, our success in providing benefits to the citizens of CARANA will secure their support to us.
- b. UNAC End State. A secure and stable environment throughout CARANA.
- c. UNAC CoG. The legitimacy of the mission as evidenced by international support and the Mandate authorized by the Peace and Security Council.
- d. UNAC Concept of Op. UNAC will conduct its operations along five major lines of operations. Decisive points (DP) for each line of operations are detailed in Annex C.
 - (1) Stabilize the Country.

- (2) Secure the Country.
 - (3) Coordination with all parties involved.
 - (4) Establish viable new CARANA Armed Forces.
 - (5) Obtain the support of the citizens of CARANA.
- e. To secure and stabilize the Country UNAC Forces will be deployed quickly and deal swiftly with any breach of the agreement from the signing parties. During Phase 1, UNAC Forces will adopt a very cooperative approach with all military factions and at the same time be ready to revert to a more aggressive posture. Special efforts will be required with those that do not follow the content of the KALARI Treaty. Of particular importance during this phase, all conditions for the delivery of Humanitarian assistance must be established and maintained. This will be followed by direct and indirect military support actions aimed at securing further the environment.

The initiation of activities such as DDR will be fully supported during Phase 2. This will create added security and in turn facilitate the safe return of refugees and deportees. Once the desired level of security and stability are achieved, UNAC Forces will switch its main effort in support of the democratization process including the conduct of a general election and the rebuilding of the CARANA Armed Forces and Police Force. Throughout the Mission, UNAC forces will ensure the protection of all UN components, related organizations and CARANA civilians by coordinating their actions, monitoring all factions activities and maintaining a 24/7 capability to take appropriate actions under Chap VII of the UN Charter as necessary. Flexibility will be ensured by a strong and very mobile Quick Reaction Force.

- (1) Phase 1 Deployment. UNAC will see the deployment of its HQ, main logistic Base, Aviation Forces, 3 Sector HQs with assigned contingents, through sea and airport points of entry at GALASI, CERINI, MALDOSA and CORMA. Other organizations will also be deployed and Joint Commission for the Ceasefire (JCC) will establish Joint Liaison Teams (JLT) down to provincial level throughout the Country. Each UNAC sector will deploy all assigned forces to monitor the cease fire within boundary, establish Humanitarian corridors and establish liaison with all parties and related agencies. Force security will be maintained throughout by securing permanent locations and maintaining Quick Reaction Forces at Mission and Sector levels. An active public information campaign will be implemented down to contingent level during this phase.
- (2) Phase 2 Implementation. During the second phase UNAC will maintain the established secure and stable environment and conduct operations in direct and indirect support to:
 - (a) Return of refugees and deportees

- (b) Establish cantonments and conduct DDR activities
 - (c) Security operations in support of electoral process
 - (d) Facilitate creation of the Country Legal structure
- (3) Phase 3 Sustainment. In Phase3, UNAC will maintain the established secure and stable environment and conduct operations focusing on:
- (a) the conduct of elections
 - (b) the formation of the National Army and, as required, the National Police force
 - (c) contingent rotations
 - (d) monitor and report of HR violations

f. Grouping and tasks

- (1) Grouping as per Annex A
- (2) Phase 1 Tasks – SECTOR 1:
 - (a) Deploy in city of GALASI
 - (b) Ensure security of all UNAC elements deployed within Boundaries
 - (c) Promote and ensure freedom of movement within boundaries
 - (d) Provide a quick reaction forces of Coy size (QRF) at 12 hours notice to move
 - (e) Participate in the Mission Information Campaign
- (3) Phase 1 Tasks - SECTORS 2 and 3:
 - (a) Deploy contingents assigned to Sector once entering AO
 - (b) Protect sea and airport points of entry within boundaries
 - (c) Protect all Airport/Airfield within boundaries
 - (d) Monitor the withdrawal of CDF, MDC and ICSC from confrontation lines in cantonment areas and establish Zones of Separation (ZOS) in areas of tension
 - (e) Promote and ensure freedom of movement
 - (f) Secure the delivery of humanitarian aid and the relief of suffering

- (g) Contact other non-signing armed factions, if any within AO, and develop local consensus to conform to the intent of the KALARI Agreement.
 - (h) Participate in the Mission Information Campaign
- (4) Phase 2 Tasks - SECTOR 1:
- (a) Ensure security of all UNAC elements deployed within Boundaries
 - (b) Promote and ensure freedom of movement within boundaries
 - (c) Provide protection and support to the Electoral Division personnel
 - (d) Provide a quick reaction force of Coy size (QRF) at 12 hours notice to move
 - (e) Participate in the Mission Information Campaign
 - (f) Assist Rule of Law division with escort protection as required
 - (g) Participate in the Mission Information Campaign
 - (h) Monitor the demobilisation and disarmament of members of the DFIM and PAM and other factions
- (5) Phase 2 Tasks - SECTORS 2 and 3:
- (a) Maintain AO secured 24/7
 - (b) Maintain freedom of movement throughout AO
 - (c) Protect sea and airport points of entry within boundaries
 - (d) Protect all Airport/Airfield within boundaries
 - (e) Provide escort protection to Electoral Division personnel when needed
 - (f) Establish Assembly Zones (AZ) and Cantonment Area (CA) for former fighters of the MDF, ICSC and other armed group, if any within AO, in preparation of demobilisation
 - (g) Monitor the demobilisation and disarmament of members of the MDF, ICSC and other factions
 - (h) Be at 72 hours notice to move to conduct cordon and search operations in support of DDR and Human Rights activities

- (i) Assist Rule of Law division with escort protection as required
 - (j) Participate in the Mission Information Campaign
- (6) Phase 3 Tasks - SECTOR 1:
- (a) Ensure security of all UNAC elements deployed within Boundaries
 - (b) Promote and ensure freedom of movement within boundaries
 - (c) Provide protection and support to the Electoral Division personnel
 - (d) Protect electoral material delivery, collect and storage throughout the electoral process while in the city of GALASI
 - (e) Monitor and assist in the training of the new CARANA Armed Forces and assist UN CIVPOL in training the new CARANA Police Force
 - (f) Provide a quick reaction force of Coy size (QRF) at 24 hours notice to move
 - (g) Participate in the Mission Information Campaign
 - (h) Assist Rule of Law division with escort protection as required
 - (i) Participate in the Mission Information Campaign
 - (j) Monitor and assist as necessary and as per capability the demobilisation and disarmament of members of the MDC, ICSC and other factions
 - (k) Be ready for additional protection tasks in support of electoral process.
- (7) Phase 3 Tasks - SECTORS 2 and 3:
- (a) Maintain AO secured 24/7
 - (b) Maintain freedom of movement throughout
 - (c) Protect sea and airport points of entry within boundaries
 - (d) Protect all Airport/Airfield within boundaries
 - (e) Provide escort protection to Electoral Division personnel when needed

- (f) Protect electoral material delivery, collect and storage throughout the electoral process
- (g) Monitor and assist in the training of the new CARANA Armed Forces and assist UN CIVPOL in training the new CARANA Police Force
- (h) Be at 48 hours notice to move to conduct cordon and search operations in support Human Rights activities
- (i) Monitor overall Humanitarian situation and report all HR violations
- (j) Participate in the Mission Information Campaign
- (k) Be ready for additional protection tasks in support of electoral process

g. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Timings.

- (a) Phase 1 to be completed as soon as possible
- (b) Phase 2 and 3 will be initiated by this HQ
- (c) DDR process to begin Aug 15 – New CARANA Armed Forces capabilities to be ready at the latest by Dec 15
- (d) Election scheduled for Feb 20XX

(2) Boundaries. Sector AOs are assigned as per Annex D

(3) Movement. All contingents' movement in and out of Theatre will be this HQ's responsibility. Once within Sector Boundary, Sectors HQ are responsible for all UNAC troop and all other UN and UN organizations movement.

(4) CIMIC. All contingents CIMIC initiative will be coordinated though the CIMIC Sub-Committee of the JCC

(5) AVN SP Req. Request for Aviation Support to be forwarded 72 hours in advance to this HQ.

(6) Liaison. Sectors are to exchange LO with neighbouring formations. All liaisons with neighbouring countries will be initiated by this HQ.

(7) Coordination.

- (a) Daily Bde/Sector Report to be submitted by 16:00 to this HQ
 - (b) UNAC morning coord. UNAC morning coord conference will be held at 0930hrs
 - (c) DDR. Sector/Bde HQs to coordinate DDR support activities with CARANA DDR Commission
 - (d) Coordination points between Sectors/Bde as per SOP. Info this HQ when coord points are manned.
 - (e) All UNAC armed forces support to Police training will be coordinated through UN CIVPOL
 - (f) Direct liaison with all other components of UNAC is authorized at Bde/Sector level
- (8) Visits. All visits within Theatre will be coordinate by this HQ

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

- a. Administrative Orders. Mission Administrative Order will be published as Annex E to the OP Order. Carana DMS will provide effective administrative, engineering, logistic and technical support for the operation of all components of UNAC and act as a financial 'watchdog'. Sector 1 will be supported directly from Central admin base and Sector Regional Admin Offices will provide support in assigned AO.
- b. Each contingent support will be as per MOUs developed between UN and the contributing countries.
- c. Defensive stores. Def stores are a Mission control item. All request to be forwarded to this HQ. Allocation to each sector in addition of basic load carried in theatre by contributing countries will be authorized by this HQ.
- d. All direct cost for military support to IDP and refugees will be captured and forwarded to this HQ though RAO.
- e. Medical. Formation's Med support facilities will ensure first and second line care and first line evacuation. Mission will provide all CASEVAC including emergency evacuation to Field Hospital, second line care and stabilization before further evacuation. CASEVAC will be requested through the Op channel. Evacuation to home country remains each contributing nation responsibilities.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNALS

- a. Command
 - (1) UNAC HQs:
 - (a) Phase 1: Fwd HQ in GALASI

(b) Phase 2 and 3: Main HQ and Alternate in GALASI

- b. Communication. Code words, nicknames, passwords and Emergency Control measures as per Annex F

Ack Instruction: ACK

Kinobe M.S.

Major General

Commander UNAC

Anxs: Annex A: UNAC Task Organization Table by Sector

Annex B: INTSUM 01/08 200900C Jul XX – Belligerents Organizations and Capabilities

Annex C: Lines of Operations and Decisive Points

Annex D: Sectors/Bde Area of Operations

Annex E: UNAC Administrative Order (*not issued*)

Annex F: UNAC Communications and Electronics Emission Measures

Annex G: UNAC Memorandum of Understanding Contingent Deployment

<u>DISTR:</u>	<u>Copy No.</u>
UNAC HQ	1-9
SECTOR 1	10-11
SECTOR 2	12-13
SECTOR 3	14-15
NIGERIA HQ AND SIG SQN	16-17
ALGERIAN INT COY	18
ZAMBIA AVN SQN	19
SOUTH AFRICAN FIELD HOSPITAL	20
EGYPTIAN MP BN	21
SOUTH AFRICAN MARITIME REACTION SQN	22
PSOD	23-28

SRCC	28-30
UNHCR	31
OCHA	32
SPARE	33 - 38
FILE	39 - 40

Annex A to OP O 01/XXXX

HQ UNAC

15 AUG XXXX

UNAC TASK ORGANIZATION TABLE


<u>UNAC</u>	<u>UNAC HQ</u>	<u>SECTOR 1</u>	<u>SECTOR 2</u>	<u>SECTOR 3</u>
<u>OP COM</u>	South Africa Maritime Reaction Squadron (-) (50)	5 Mil Obs teams (30)	9 Mil Obs teams (54)	8 Mil Obs teams (48)
	South Africa Fd Hospital (180)			
	Egyptian MP Bn HQ (50)			
	Zambia Avn Sqn (-) (102)			
<u>OP CON</u>	Nigeria HQ and Sig Sqn (200)	South Africa Bde HQ/Sign Sqn (150)	Kenya Bde HQ/Sigs Sqn (150)	Ghana Bde HQ and Sig Coy (150)
	Staff Officers (160)	Malawian Inf Coy (144)	Kenya Mech/Light Inf Bn (600)	Ghana Inf Bn (600)
	CIMIC Coy (-) (40)	Namibian Bn + Log Coy (740)	Rwanda Mech/Light Inf Bn (600)	Nigeria Mech Inf Bn (600)
		Botswana Inf Coy (120)	Uganda Mech/Armd/Light Inf Bn (600)	Senegal Log Coy (150)
		Zambia Field Engr Sqn (120)	Ethiopian Log Coy (150)	Ghana Field Engr Sqn (120)
		South Africa Maritime Reaction Platoon (48)	Kenyan Field Engr Sqn (120)	South Africa Maritime Reaction Platoon (48)

<u>UNAC</u>	<u>UNAC HQ</u>	<u>SECTOR 1</u>	<u>SECTOR 2</u>	<u>SECTOR 3</u>
			South Africa Maritime Reaction Platoon (48)	
<u>TAC COM</u>	Algerian Int Coy (90)	CIMIC Det (6)	CIMIC Det (6)	CIMIC Det (6)
		DDR Tm (10)	DDR Tm (10)	DDR Tm (10)
<u>TAC CON</u>		Egyptian MP Coy (90)	Egyptian MP Coy (80)	Egyptian MP Coy (90)
			South African Forward Medical Detachment (80)	South African Forward Medical Detachment (80)
			Zambian Aviation Flt (50)	Zambian Aviation Flt (50)
<u>Total</u>	852	1458	2548	1942

Note 1: Command relationships were derived from the Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) between the UN and the contributing countries. Specific tactical employments of the forces assigned are defined in these MOU. Each nation must be consulted prior to using their Forces assigned to UNAC in a role/task not identified in the MOU.

BELLIGERENT ORGANISATIONS AND CAPABILITIES

1. Parti Democratique de CARANA (PDC). CARANA is essentially a one-party state. The PDC are internationally recognised as the legitimate government of CARANA having been founded in 1986 for the country's first free elections. Jackson Ogavo, leader of the PDC, became the first elected president of CARANA. Initially the government was reasonably representative of the ethnic balance of the country, although still dominated by the Falin, and it followed democratic principles that were later enshrined in the 1991 constitution. During the early years some economic and social reforms were realized but over time, Ogavo's focus changed, and he became preoccupied with quietly suppressing all opposition groups and enhancing his own power base. Beginning in 1995, he expanded the influence of the central government on all economic and social activities by laws and administrative rules. The 1996 replacement of all key Kori and Tatsi government ministers with members of Ogavo's Falin tribe was followed by an increasingly repressive regime, administrative and economic inefficiency, and corruption. As in the government, the Carana Defence Forces (CDF) are dominated by the Falin and have become the de facto military arm of the party.



2. CDF. The CDF consists of approximately 10,000 personnel in 4 'area commands' and an air force, equipped with a mixture of former French, American and

South African weapons and vehicles. The majority of equipment is in a poor state of repair. The most effective and best-equipped brigade, with some M3 APCs and AMX 13 tanks, is the Northern Area. The least effective and worst equipped is the Central Area. With a small number of coastal and river patrol boats, the Navy plays a specialized but insignificant role in the Defence Force. The Air Force, equipped with a squadron of armed helicopters, transport helicopters and a few light bombers has a limited striking capacity. This limited capacity allowed the government to project its power over the entire country during the conflict. However, this limited capacity was not sufficient to deliver decisive strikes against the various rebel groups. Currently, the six Alpha Jets can be assessed as non-operational. The CDF headquarters is collocated with PDC headquarters in GALASI.

3. Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC). With an eye on future elections, the leadership of MPC is currently developing its political platform and preparing for a long-term political role. Given the precedent set during the fighting in terms of its ability to coordinate activities against the government, it has the potential to become an effective political force. It enjoys broad public support in the west as it is seen to have the ability to address the concerns and needs of the people when the government had failed. In some areas the MPC have taken over government and basic administrative functions. The MPC operates a harsh public order regime but have repeatedly indicated that they respect human rights, especially the rights of the child. As a result of broad public support, and dissatisfaction with the government, the new administrative role of the MPC is increasingly accepted by the population in the west – other elements remain compliant out of fear for the MPC.

4. Original assessment of the MPC strength was somewhat conservative and has been adjusted from a total of 6,000 to approximately 10,000. Approximately 5,000 MPC returned home last month but most have kept their weapons and remain ready to return to their formations if necessary. It is assessed that the remaining 5000 MPC rebels are sufficient to balance the presence of the CDF on the separation line and maintain the status quo, especially when backed up by the knowledge that they can quickly be reinforced. It is assessed that the underlying reason for this redeployment is to ensure that the front line MPC troops are logistically sustainable, and they certainly appear better prepared than many of their CDF counterparts.

5. The MPC is structured into groups of 750 men. Each of these groups is lead by a field commander and has a local network of supporters. The groups have no internally defined military structure, but a system of sub-commanders with different numbers of fighters. The loyalty to the commanders is high and discipline is very good. The deployed elements of the MPC have established camps of up to approximately 250 from whence they conduct patrols west of the separation line; while this is not in contravention of the Kalari Treaty it has the potential to act as a trigger for other action whether by mistake or by design.

6. The MPC is lightly armed but AK47 assault rifles, RPG7 anti-tank weapons and a variety of medium and heavy machine guns. They do not have any armoured vehicles but are extremely mobile using "technical's" - light trucks mounting machine guns or recoilless rifles.

7. The official HQ of MPC is in ALURr but this is more a symbolic HQ than an operational one. After the end of fighting, the official HQ in ALUR increased in importance and became a basic administrative centre of the region. Some leaders of MPC are permanently in ALUR.

8. Independent Combatants du Sud Carana (ICSC). The ICSC is an unstructured formation of rebels with diverging backgrounds. Some members are deserters from the CDF, while others are from the civil war in RIMOSA. The movement has also been successful in recruiting young men from the local population. This is mostly due to recent rebel successes along with the poor economic situation. The discipline and internal cohesion of this rebel group is low, as is the standard of training. The ICSC lacks the structure or organisation that would enable it to develop into an effective political body. It owes its following to frustration over poor living conditions, general dissatisfaction with the Ogavo administration and longstanding ethnic hostilities with the Falin minority in LEPPKO province. Unlike the MPC, the ICSC has not tried to establish administrative functions and exercises control in the region only by the rule of the force. It has never made an attempt to capitalize on its potential and has probably missed the opportunity to do so in that it has never articulated any clear political objectives. It may become increasingly frustrated when it sees itself marginalised.

9. The public support for ICSC is based mainly in the Tatsi dominated Southern region because of many acts of violence against the population. During the fighting, ICSC fighters operated primarily from their villages without deploying in camps or permanent positions. After the fighting stopped, it can be assumed that most ICSC rebels were living in their home villages and group only occasionally. The loose structure of ICSC makes it very difficult to assess their strength and positions precisely. It can be assumed that the number of active fighters has not changed and remains in the region of 2000-3000. They are equipped with assault rifles, light machine guns and anti-tank weapons. They are notably brutal in combat and show no regard for the rights of non-combatants.

10. Hitherto the ICSC has focused its attention on the CDF and has relied upon the strong anti-government feelings in the south for most of its support, however there have been a number recent reports of several acts of violence against ethnic minorities in the south of the area adjacent to the border with RIMOSA. It remains to be seen whether these have involved members of the ICSC, in which case it would be in violation of the Kalari Treaty, or whether they are the responsibility of other groups who are not signatories. Reports indicate the former although this has not been corroborated.

11. Dispositions. A map showing the approximate dispositions of the belligerent factions at the time of the Kalari Peace talks is at Appendix.

Serial- 10

Issue: All (E-7)

Module- 8: INSTEX

Annex C to OP O 01/XXXX

HQ UNAC

15 AUG XXXX

UNAC - LINE OF OPERATIONS AND DECISION POINTS (DP)

1. Belligerents Centres of Gravity:
 - a. CDF. The CDF is the military wing of the recognized government. As such, their CoG is their status as the legitimate military force of CARANA.
 - b. MPC. The MPC is seen as having the ability to address the concerns and needs of the people where the government has failed. As a result, their CoG is based on broad public support and general dissatisfaction with the government.
 - c. ICSC. The ICSC draw their will to fight from a long history of economic neglect and violence against the local population. As a result, their CoG is the support of dispossessed minorities, particularly from the Tatsi clan.
2. Lines of operations:
 - a. **Stabilize the Country:**
 - (1) DP 1 - Ensure all armed activities cease
 - (2) DP 2 - Establish and maintain Secure Zones
 - (3) DP 3 - Establish local agreements with all factions
 - (4) DP 4 - Monitor cease-fire and take appropriate action when broken by any of the factions
 - (5) DP 5 - Support the electoral process and initiatives toward good governance
 - b. **Secure the Country**
 - (1) DP 1 - Ensure force security
 - (2) DP 2 - Ensure freedom of movement
 - (3) DP 3 - Protect all UN and UN related agencies and locals
 - (4) DP 3 - Use minimum force to ensure adherence to the cease-fire and local agreements
 - (5) DP 4 - Ensure the return of law and order

Module- 8: INSTEX

- c. **Obtain support of CARANA citizens**
 - (1) DP 1 - Support the provision of Humanitarian Assistance (HA)
 - (2) DP 2 - Protect citizens of CARANA
 - (3) DP 3 - Support the return of deportees, refugees and IDPs
 - (4) DP 4 - Assist in the rebuilding of the country's infrastructure (Schools, Hospitals, etc.)

- d. **Establish Unified Armed Forces of CARANA**
 - (1) DP 1 - Disarm Factions
 - (2) DP 2 - Demobilize Factions
 - (3) DP 3 - Reintegration
 - (4) DP 4 - Training and formation
 - (5) DP 5 – Establish citizen confidence in their new armed forces

- e. **Coordination with all parties.**
 - (1) DP 1 – Establish JCC structure
 - (2) DP 2 – MOU with all of armed groups/factions involved
 - (3) DP 3 – Establish other structures at Mission and Sector level to coordinate all activities including:
 - (a) Provision of HA
 - (b) Return of IDPs and refugees
 - (c) Electoral Process
 - (d) DDR process
 - (e) Establishment of Rule of Law.

Serial- 10

Issue: All (E-7)


Module- 8: INSTEX

Annex D to OP O 01/XXXX

HQ UNAC

15 AUG XXXX

UNAC - NET DIAGRAM



Serial- 10

Issue: All (E-7)

Module- 8: INSTEX

COLLECTIVE CALLS

CC1 (Sectors) 1, 2, 3

CC2 (Manoeuvre Units) 1, 2, 3, 4, 12, 13

CC3 (Galasi Units) 4, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18

Annex E to OP O 01/XXXX

HQ UNAC

15 AUG XXXX

UNAC MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING CONTINGENT DEPLOYMENT

INTRODUCTION

1. As a principal, the deployment of international contingents to UNAC will take place recognizing contingent requirements in regard to all deployment caveats as enumerated in superior orders and instructions.
2. In support, HQ UNAC will provide for liaison with contingents to facilitate effective monitoring of all deployment caveats.

AIM

3. The aim of this Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is to detail operational deployment caveats for UNAC contingents within CARANA AOs.

CONTINGENT CAVEATS

4. Kenyan Field Engineer Squadron
 - a. The Kenyan Field Engineer Squadron will deploy on assigned tasks in not less than troop strength for any period in excess of 24 hours. Where this guideline cannot be met, written authorization from the Kenyan National Authority is required.
 - b. Kenyan Field Engineer elements deployed on operational tasks will be provided with close protection.
5. Egyptian Military Police Company. The Egyptian Military Police Company will only conduct VIP close protection tasks with the assistance of contingent troops from the AO within which they will be conducting close protection tasks.
6. Kenyan Battalion. The Kenyan Battalion will deploy elements into another contingent's AO only when written authorization is received from the Kenyan National Authority. Such a deployment must be at least company strength in size.
8. Rwandan Battalion. All Rwandan National Holidays will be recognized with a reduction of unit duty strength to a minimum level without compromising contingent security.