



# **MILITARY PLANNING PROCESS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

**Department of Peacekeeping Operations  
Office of Military Affairs  
Military Planning Service**

**November 2009**

## REFERENCES

- A. Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP) Guidelines endorsed by the Secretary-General dated June 2006.
- B. IMPP Guidelines – Role of Headquarters dated May 09.
- C. Guidelines – UN Strategic Assessment dated May 09.
- D. Generic Guidelines for Troop Contributing Countries Deploying Military Units to United Nations Peacekeeping Missions – March 2008.
- E. DPKO / DFS Policy Directive – Risk Management dated 1 April 2009.
- F. Authority, Command and Control in UN Peacekeeping Operations dated 15 February 2008.
- G. The United Nations Manual for Contingent Owned Equipment.
- H. Guidelines for the Development of ROE dated May 2002.
- I. Directive for the Head of a Military Component in a Peacekeeping Operation dated 27 Jun 2008.

## INTRODUCTION

1. The DPKO Military Planning Process (MPP) is designed to guide Military Planning Officers through the process of developing strategic and operational plans for the military components of current and future peacekeeping operations, in close coordination with partners within the United Nations system. It aims to deliver comprehensive military peacekeeping solutions with a high probability of success.
2. MPP will most commonly be used to establish the military component of new missions, to review the military operations of current missions after a significant change in circumstances, or to develop contingency plans for developing crises. MPP progresses in parallel with the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) detailed at reference A, and provides the military input into it. Hence it is critical that all Military Planning Officers are fully conversant with reference A before commencing military planning.
3. This document does not cover comprehensively all of the tasks of the Military Planning Service; it focuses on how to plan a military peacekeeping solution and develop a Concept of Operations that can then form the basis of subsequent planning.

## **MILITARY PLANNING**

4. Military planning is a process that relies on commanders to resolve problems and make decisions to achieve an objective in a dynamic environment. Successful military operations rely on commanders making correct decisions that are developed into feasible plans and executed in a timely and appropriate manner. Hasty and incomplete planning will likely result in the inefficient use of resources, potentially the loss of life, and ultimately mission failure. Mastery in planning and decision making is achieved by the commander and staff understanding and employing a common and comprehensive process.

5. MPP is a logical process that facilitates timely planning and complex decision making required by peacekeeping operations. It is an assumption-based method where known information is analysed and unknown information is deduced using risk-managed assumptions. It is a comprehensive process that forces planners to consider the full scope of determining factors before presuming a military solution. It is critical that planners follow the process sequentially, understand the risks associated with the assumptions they make, and refrain from shaping their analysis to suit a predetermined course of action.


6. It is accepted that the requirement to plan peacekeeping operations does not always provide planners with the infinite time required to produce the perfect plans. A time constraint however should not necessarily cause a break from the process, rather it simply requires the process to be adjusted to meet the needs of the time restriction.

## PHASES OF THE MILITARY PLANNING PROCESS

7. There are five distinct phases of MPP:

- a. Analysis of the Operational Environment.
- b. Mission Analysis.
- c. Course of Action Development.
- d. Course of Action Analysis and Decision.
- e. Production of CONOPS, Force Requirements and ROE.

8. Although MPP is a sequential process, it is also a circular process. Planning Officers must continually review each step of the process as their knowledge of the potential mission improves and the commander's guidance evolves. Failure to continually review each step will limit the planners ability to provide suitable courses of action, and ultimately limit the commander's<sup>1</sup> ability to choose the most appropriate course of action.



*Figure 1 Phases of Military Planning Process. Note that Phase 1 is ongoing throughout the process, and that each Phase is reviewed as the process progresses.*

9. **Phase Progression.** MPP works most efficiently when the commander is able to provide guidance at regular intervals to ensure the planning is meeting his or her requirements. It is therefore recommended that each phase of MPP be presented as a verbal brief, supported by audio visual aids, to at least a Service Chief, but ideally the MILAD or DMILD, to ensure plans are progressing appropriately. If this is not feasible, it is vital that the part of Mission Analysis that analyses the commander's intent is completed in specific detail to ensure there is no misunderstanding between the commander and the planning officers.

<sup>1</sup> The term 'commander' in this document refers to the higher authority providing direction at the time of planning. It may range from an authority such as the Security Council or USG, through to the MILAD or CMPS.

## **ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT**

10. Analysis of the Operational Environment (AOE), often referred to as Area of Operations Analysis (AOA) or Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB), is the first phase of MPP, and a phase that continues throughout the planning process as the plan is further developed. In this context, the Operational Environment is viewed strategically, and will therefore be much larger in size than the resultant Area of Operations. The Assessment Team in OMA must be involved in this step.

11. AOE is essentially research followed by analysis of that research. Once the need to conduct MPP has been established, Planning Officers must study as much as they can about the area in which the operation will take place. AOE will start out broad and often incomplete. It will become more detailed, more accurate and more complete as the planning becomes more developed and more refined. Mission analysis will almost always commence before a full AOE has been completed.

12. Technical Assessment Missions (TAM) and Military Capability Studies form part of the AOE and should be conducted in accordance with reference A prior to approval of a new plan. However, planning can still progress to an advanced stage without a TAM, and indeed only once planning has progressed to an advanced stage will the specific requirements of a TAM be fully appreciated.

13. AOE consists of three steps:

- a. Define the Operational Environment (raw facts).
- b. Describe the Operational Effects (the effect of those raw facts on a PKO).
- c. Threat Analysis and Adversary Courses of Action.

### **Describe the Operational Environment**

14. The purpose of this step is to learn about the area in which the operation will take place, and specifically to:

- a. Review the existing situation - what is the cause of the unrest and what peace agreements are in place?
- b. Scope the likely threats - who's who and what is their agenda?
- c. Identify significant characteristics of the environment - such as climate, terrain, infrastructure, lines of communication, etc.
- d. Determine AO limitations – define the 'Area of Interest' and 'Area of Intelligence Responsibility'.
- e. Identify intelligence gaps - what is unknown?
- f. Determine key future information requirements.

15. A detailed list of the information that should be researched for a peacekeeping operation is listed as annex A.

## Describe the Operational Effects

16. This step analyses the information gathered in step 1 to determine its impact on the operation (i.e. it provides the 'so what'). The effect of the environment on both friendly and adversary forces needs to be determined, and these assessments should not be made in isolation or with bias. In isolation one factor may appear to be of value to own forces, but it may be of even greater value to an adversary force. Similarly, it is unlikely that an operational environment will be homogeneous. Some factors will have differing effects in different areas, and will suit different types of operations and/or force structures. Planning officers should therefore identify the factors that favour certain types of operations and/or balance of forces so that the effects are provided in context.

***An example of assessing the effect on own and adversary forces;***

*In isolation, fine weather may appear to be positive for the PKO, but it might be even more valuable to an adversary who relies solely on a dirt road network for logistics.*


***An example of assessing the effect on different own force structures;***

*A strong regional identity in the AO might be positive for a small regional PKO force, but this may not hold true for a large multi-national PKO force.*

## Military Threat Assessment and Adversary Courses of Action

17. The military threat assessment focuses solely on armed threats to the PKO that might affect the safety and security of own forces, designated persons and designated infrastructure. The military threat assessment for a peacekeeping operation can be even more complicated to conduct than for war-like operations because the adversary is commonly defined by irregular and complex relationships that often change if other conditions change. It is unlikely that the adversary will be a force easily identified by their military uniforms, equipment and tactics. However, while the likely adversary may not have the makings of a traditional military force, their potentially strong organisation, local knowledge, passion for their cause, local support networks and fighting experience could still make them a formidable foe.

18. The military threat assessment, like most of the AOE, evolves throughout the planning process. In the early stages, it will be a generic assessment combining the influences of actors external to the AO (neighbouring states, NGOs, special interest groups), actors internal to the AO (political groups, clans or tribes, business groups) and key leaders (allegiances, political agendas, religion). By the end of the planning process, the threat assessment will have thoroughly considered likely adversary courses of action, and adversary reactions to each of the own force COAs being considered for the peacekeeping force.



**Figure 2** *Factors Combining to form the Threat Assessment*

19. As a minimum, an assessment of all the potential adversary groups must include:
- a. Political agenda.
  - b. Leadership.
  - c. Force size.
  - d. Force structure and disposition.
  - e. Logistics and sustainability.
  - f. Capability and known tactics.

20. **Threat.** Threat is a product of both capability and intent. A potential adversary group with intent to cause harm but with minimal capability is a limited threat, whereas a group with significant capability but no intent poses almost no threat. The capability of the peacekeeping force to counter threats also needs to be considered, because again, even if an adversary has every intent to oppose a peacekeeping force, if that peacekeeping force is able to prevent the militant group from operating effectively, they again pose little threat to the operation.

$$\text{Threat} = \text{Capability} \times \text{Intent}$$

21. **Risk.** Threats can be effectively analysed using risk management principles (reference E). Risk is a product of the likelihood of an event occurring and the impact if that event does occur. For example, the risk to personnel of a helicopter being shot down may be low because the likelihood of the event occurring is low, even though the impact may be fatal. Similarly, the risk of a Navy ship being engaged with small arms may be low, even if the likelihood is high, because the impact will likely be minimal. The risk of each threat must be assessed not only as risks to personnel, but also other risks such as those to essential equipment and to mission success.

$$\text{Risk} = \text{Likelihood} \times \text{Impact}$$

22. Once the threats have been risk assessed, measures required to mitigate against the highest risks must be considered. The risk analysis provides planning officers with a priority list of threats that need to be mitigated against based on how high the risk is for each threat.

*Example of mitigating against a high risk threat; to mitigate against the threat of roadside IEDs, a PKO plan would need to include factors such as personal protective equipment, mine protected vehicles and explosive ordnance disposal teams.*

23. **Adversary COAs.** The threat is not only affected by the COAs of the peacekeeping force. Adversary groups will have their own choice of COAs that need to be considered. To develop adversary COAs, planning officers have to view the operation from the perspective of the adversary and determine adversary COAs in the same manner that COAs are developed for the peacekeeping force. Each of these adversary COAs will result in different threats and risks to the peacekeeping force. The **most dangerous** and **most likely** adversary COAs need to be studied in the most detail.

24. The final Threat Analysis product should include a thorough description of the likely adversary groups, a subjective written assessment, and a substantive risk assessment for each adversary COA. Only by providing all of these components in the threat assessment will the commander be able to accurately assess the threat, determine the acceptability of the risks, and then make sound decisions accordingly.

***Remember IMPP!***

*Remember that while the planning process is occurring, IMPP is also continuing. The strategic level IMPP will be evolving, refining the mission and developing the other non-military components of the peacekeeping operation. These factors will necessarily influence the military component of the peacekeeping plan and it is therefore essential that the MPP be conducted together with IMPP and not in isolation.*

## **MISSION ANALYSIS**

25. Mission Analysis is the principal decision making tool that guides the planning process. It takes the higher-level guidance provided to the planners, challenges it against the facts and assumptions, and then refines it to better detail the mission and the planning requirements. The higher-level guidance for the military component of peacekeeping operations may be very specific and well developed resulting from IMPP, such as a Security Council Mandate or USG's Directive, or it may simply be verbal guidance from the MILAD or Service Chief to enable the MPP to commence.

26. Specifically, the Mission Analysis must:
- a. Review the AOE.
  - b. Review directives and mandate.
  - c. Draft Commander's Intent.
  - d. Identify and analyse tasks.
  - e. Identify and analyse constraints and restrictions.
  - f. Identify and analyse critical facts and assumptions.
  - g. Draft the Mission Statement.

### **Review the AOE**

27. Updating the AOE is a continuous process and so the AOE needs to be reviewed at every phase of MPP. New information or strategic direction will effect the direction of MPP, so before developing the Mission, AOE must be reviewed to keep the mission development in context.

### **Review Directives and Mandate**

28. At the strategic level, USG's directives and/or Security Council Mandates will provide the initial guidance from which the Commander's Intent and the Mission Statement will eventually result. Such directives and mandates may not provide a specific military mission or objective, so they must be analysed in detail to ensure the military planning is meeting the objectives of the directive or mandate. Analysis of the Directives and mandate will lead to drafting the Commander's Intent.

### **Draft Commander's Intent**

29. Commander's Intent provides specific military direction and intentions from the MILAD derived from the higher level Directives and Mandates. Commander's Intent is not meant to be too specific, it will not provide detailed tasks or actions, rather it provides direction to the planning officers so that they can determine the solution. The end state should refer to conditions for the force to withdraw (the exit strategy) that can later be used to develop benchmarks against which progress can be measured.

30. The Commander's Intent can be divided into three parts; purpose, method and endstate.
- a. The purpose provides the reason for the force conducting the operation.
  - b. The method describes generically how the purpose is to be achieved.
  - c. The endstate defines the success criteria for completion of the operation.

***Example of Commander's Intent:***

*Purpose: To disrupt insurgents' ability to conduct offensive operations by denying them access to XXX town, their key logistics hub.*

*Method: I will use a robust joint military force to overwhelm insurgents and secure key infrastructure in XXX town, build defensible positions, & then expand our military presence to secure key LOC using force if required.*

*Endstate: The deployment of a joint military force has reduced insurgent influence in, & ability to use, XXX town and the region; & enabled the expansion of TFG presence.*

### **Identify and Analyse Tasks**

31. By categorising the required tasks as **specified, implied and essential**, the planning officer starts the process of shaping the operation. Generic orders now become much more specific and the planning process becomes much more focused.
32. Specified tasks are those found clearly stated within the USG's Directive or Security Council Mandate. They must be completed because they have been ordered specifically from above. Implied tasks are those that must be performed to accomplish a specified task, but which are not specifically ordered. Implied tasks are derived from a detailed analysis of the directive or mandate, the enemy situation and courses of action, and the terrain. Analysis of the unit's current location in relation to its future area of operations provides insights into implied tasks that may be required to perform specified tasks. Additionally, an analysis of the doctrinal requirements for each specified task might provide implied tasks. Only those implied tasks that require allocation of resources should be retained.
33. Once planning officers have a list of specified and implied tasks, they ensure they understand each task's specific requirements. After analysing specified and implied tasks, they present to the commander for his approval a tentative list of tasks that must be executed to accomplish the mission. These tasks are the essential tasks.

## Identify and Analyse Constraints and Restrictions

34. Constraints (also referred to as limitations) are characteristics that cannot be changed and that affect the conduct of operations, such as distances, timings, and limitations of own force equipment and capabilities. Restrictions are actions that a superior authority imposes that affect the manner in which the subordinate commander can conduct the operation. Examples of restrictions are; being required to not break international laws or agreements, to not conduct a pre-emptive strike, and to not operate in a contested region.

*A simple way to remember the meaning of constraints and restrictions is;*

- a. constraints = 'must do' actions  
(i.e. must operate within an urban environment)*
- b. restrictions = 'must not do' actions  
(i.e. must not disrupt legal economic activity)*

## Identify and Analyse Critical Facts and Assumptions

35. Planning officers gather two categories of information concerning the mission, facts and assumptions. Facts are statements of known data concerning the situation, assumptions are suppositions about the current or future situation that are assumed to be true in the absence of facts. They take the place of necessary, but unavailable, facts and fill the gaps in what the commander and staff know about a situation. An assumption is appropriate if it meets the tests of validity and necessity. Validity means the assumption is likely to be true. "Assuming away" potential problems is dangerous. Necessity is whether or not the assumption is essential for planning. If planning can continue without the assumption, it is not necessary and should be discarded. **Assumptions are replaced with facts as soon as possible.**

36. On completion of analysing critical facts and assumptions, the planning officer will be left with many Information Requirements (IR), sourced from the list of assumptions, that need to be answered in order to effectively conduct the mission. The most important of these are termed **Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR)**. CCIRs identify information needed by the commander to make critical decisions, especially to determine or validate courses of action. They help the commander filter information available to him by defining what is important to mission accomplishment. They also help focus the efforts of subordinates and staff, assist in the allocation of resources, and assist staff officers in making recommendations.

37. CCIR should be limited to ten or less to enhance comprehension. The CCIR directly affect the success or failure of the mission. This is what distinguishes them from other 'nice to have' Requests for Information (RFI) that will provide information that is valuable but will not change the way in which the operation is to be conducted.

## **Draft the Mission Statement**

38. The final output of this phase is the development of a mission statement, if it hasn't already been specifically provided by the commander from the beginning, or the development of a proposed mission statement for the commander's approval. The mission statement should describe the task with a purpose, and can be expressed using the elements of who, what, when, where and why. The mission statement must precisely and concisely state the mission based on the previous steps in the Mission Analysis phase.

***Example Mission Statement:***

*Acting under chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the UNPKO Military Component will contribute to the development of a sustainable security environment by protecting civilians within capabilities and in its area of deployment, and supporting the implementation of the XXX peace processes in order to foster the reinsertion of state authority.*

## **COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT**

39. Having thoroughly analysed the requirements of the mission, and after receiving command guidance and approval of the proposed mission statement, the staff develops COAs for analysis and comparison. The commander must involve himself in their development. His guidance and intent focus the staff's creativity to produce a comprehensive, flexible plan within the time constraints. His direct participation helps the staff get quick, accurate answers to questions that occur during the process. COA development is a deliberate attempt to design unpredictable COAs (difficult for the enemy to deduce).

### **Guidelines and Steps to Develop COAs.**

40. There are five steps to COA development:
- a. Confirm centre of gravity.
  - b. Conduct critical capability analysis.
  - c. Develop decisive points and lines of operation.
  - d. Develop broad courses of action.
  - e. Develop detailed courses of action.

### **Confirm Centre of Gravity.**

41. The centre of gravity for any force can be defined as the characteristic, capability or locality from which the force derives its freedom of action, strength or will to engage in the operation. A COG will consist of Critical Capabilities (a characteristic of key element of a force that if destroyed or neutralised will significantly undermine operational capability), Critical Requirements (an essential condition, resource or means that is needed for a critical capability to be fully functional) and Critical Vulnerabilities (an element of a critical requirement that is vulnerable or that can be made vulnerable). While a COG can have several elements, there can be only one COG for each force. Understanding own and adversary's COG is critical to developing a successful plan.

### **Conduct Critical Capability Analysis.**

42. Directly targeting the adversary's COG may not always be the most effective approach to defeating the adversary. The aim is to affect the adversary COG while avoiding their strengths and minimizing the risks to own force. To do this effectively, the Critical Capabilities of both own and adversary forces must be analysed. When conducting this analysis, it is important to remember that it is not simply a comparison of the two forces that is being conducted. The analysis must result in identifying critical capabilities of the adversary that are vulnerable and can therefore be targeted, and identifying critical capabilities of own force that are vulnerable and therefore need to be well defended. A simple comparison of forces for a peacekeeping operation will almost always show that the peacekeeping force has greater strength than the adversary, but such a simple comparison is dangerous because that strength advantage only matters if it is used to advantage.

### **Develop Decisive Points and Lines of Operation.**

43. A Decisive Point (DP) is the achievement of desired effects. A DP may be a physical effect, such as securing a vital piece of local infrastructure or destroying a piece of adversary equipment, or it may be less tangible such as winning the support of the local population or degradation of the adversary's will to fight. It is decisive because the operation cannot progress further until this DP has achieved. DPs should be described in terms of their effect, must be measurable and have a clearly articulated purpose.

44. A Line of Operation (LOO) is the linking of Decisive Points to achieve the required effect on the adversary's COG. A LOO may be expressed functionally, such as a logistics LOO or a humanitarian LOO, or environmentally, such as land LOO or a maritime LOO. The result of this step is that the operation will be broken down into distinguishable Lines of Operation with easily identifiable Decisive Points that must be achieved in order for the operation to progress.

### **Develop Broad Courses of Action**

45. Broad COAs are developed by scoping the various ways in which the mission can be achieved, guided by the multitude of parameters imposed by the planning process thus far that increase the likelihood of mission success.

46. Each COA considered must meet the criteria of:

- a. **Suitability.** It must accomplish the mission and comply with the commander's guidance. If it cannot achieve the mission then it is not an acceptable COA.
- b. **Feasibility.** The PKO must have the capability to accomplish the mission in terms of available time, space, and resources.
- c. **Acceptability.** The tactical or operational advantage gained by executing the COA must justify the cost in resources, especially casualties.
- d. **Distinguish-ability.** Each COA must differ significantly from any others, otherwise the staff are not providing the commander with real alternatives.
- e. **Completeness.** It must be a complete mission statement.

47. A broad COA should only be considered if it can achieve the mission statement and comply with the commander's guidance. COAs should not be developed just for the sake of providing choices. As soon as it is apparent that a COA cannot meet the criteria, it should be dismissed. The commander only wants to be presented options that can achieve success. Planning officers should also be wary of forming a bias in favour of any given COA, and push that as the best option. The best COA will be chosen once all COAs have been objectively analysed, and each COA needs to be presented objectively. A good COA positions the force for future operations and provides flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution.

**Develop detailed Courses of Action**

48. Planning officers must now turn broad concepts into real options. This increase in detail is required for the COAs to be properly tested and for the commander to receive enough information to make a quality decision. This step requires planning officers to develop each COA almost to the point being able to write a CONOPS document for each one. Failing to develop each COA to this detail wont allow the COAs to be analysed well enough to result in the best COA being chosen by the commander.

49. To develop the COAs in enough detail, at a minimum the following must be considered for each COA:

- a. Main effort.
- b. Supporting effort.
- c. Integration of different Lines of Operation.
- d. Command, control and communications.
- e. Adversary threats, risks and COA.
- f. Tested against suitability, feasibility, acceptability, distinguish-ability and completeness.

50. A **Synchronisation Matrix** is an effective way to organise the details of each COA. The synchronisation matrix lists the main events of each line of operation against each phase, for both own force and adversary. This allows the commander to see what is supposed to occur and when. It also allows the Decisive Points to be highlighted so the commander can focus his or her attention accordingly. The lines of operation will differ for each operation, and only some of them will be the responsibility for the military force, however coordinating all of them is necessary for the peacekeeping plan to be successful.

		Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Phase 5	Phase 6
<b>Time</b>							
<b>Main Effort</b>	<b>Own Force</b>						
	<b>Adversary</b>						
<b>L I N E S  O F  O P E R A T I O N</b>	<b>Political</b>						
	<b>Information Operations</b>						
	<b>Intelligence</b>						
	<b>Security</b>						
	<b>Maritime</b>						
	<b>Logistics</b>						
	<b>Humanitarian Assistance</b>						
<b>Tasks</b>	<b>Specified</b>						
	<b>Implied</b>						
	<b>Essential</b>						
<b>Endstate</b>							

*Figure 3 Example Synchronisation Matrix Format*

## COA ANALYSIS

51. COA Analysis identifies the strengths and weaknesses of each COA developed. It should be done separately for each COA initially, ideally by war-gaming, and then presented to the commander as a comparison of the COAs. **This phase is heavily reliant on the accuracy of the threat assessment, risks and adversary COAs.** It is thus critical that the threat assessment is complete by this stage, and that the shortcomings of threat assessment are understood and accounted for. Analysing COAs against an unrealistic threat is a pointless activity that will lead to a decreased likelihood of mission success.

52. OMA does not have a facility to conduct computer simulated war-gaming, so war-gaming will likely be an academic exercise rather than a practical one. Nevertheless, this less sophisticated method can still test each COA against what the adversary might do to. The success of war-gaming is dependant on adherence to some basic rules:

- a. Remain objective and impartial.
- b. Ensure each COA remains credible and desist if it does not.
- c. Avoid drawing premature conclusions.
- d. Each friendly COA must be war-gamed against each adversary COA.

53. On completion of the COA Analysis, the COAs are compared with each other, using the same criteria, to determine which COA is the most appropriate. This is best achieved by using a decision matrix that measures the success of critical areas of each COA and presents them as a comparison. Determining the appropriate criteria to use for comparison is essential to the effectiveness of this method. Refer back to Mission Analysis to help determine the criteria that best measure the likely success of each COA. There are several ways a Decision Matrix can be constructed. The example below simply assigns each criteria as a positive or a negative. Other methods assign a numerical score to each criteria, and some will also assign a weight to each criteria because not all criteria will be as important as each other. Planning officers can choose which method they use, but must remain aware of the limitations of their chosen method. The Decision Matrix methodology works well, but is not perfect. So while a Decision Matrix will likely deduce the most appropriate COA, it still needs to be balanced with a subjective assessment and should not be relied upon as a conclusive selection.

## **PRODUCTION OF CONOPS, FORCE REQUIREMENTS AND ROE**

54. Once the commander has chosen the COA, orders must be produced before the plan can be executed. For peacekeeping operations, at headquarters level, the following orders are required before further operational and tactical planning can be undertaken:

- a. Operational Estimate.
- b. Concept of Operations (CONOPS).
- c. Force Requirements.
- d. Rules of Engagement (ROE).

55. **Operational Estimate.** The Operational Estimate is a holistic summary of the military planning process up to but not including the CONOPS. Prior to the production of CONOPS, it can be presented to senior officers as a summary of the peacekeeping problem and of the military solutions. When read before the CONOPS, it provides the reader with the background information that puts the chosen COA and the CONOPS in perspective. The format for the Operational Estimate document is at Annex B.

56. **Concept of Operations.** The Military Concept of Operations is the final result from the MPP, as part of IMPP, which details the information required by the Force Commander and his staff to execute the chosen COA. The CONOPS is not intended to be a stand alone document, and should be read in the context of Security Council resolutions and Secretary-General's reports pertaining to the specific crisis situation. To this end, the CONOPS should be written in concise military language and should not attempt to replace other references, although it may be necessary to highlight the key points with broad military/security implications.

57. In the case of a new PKO, the FC and his staff shall use the CONOPS to develop the Operation Order (OPORD), which to the extent possible should be completed prior to the beginning of the operation and endorsed by the SRSG. In the case of an existing mission, whose mandate has been revised or whose force levels have been adjusted, the military concept of operations will need to be reviewed accordingly, and subsequently the Force Commander will adjust his OPORD. In addition, all CONOPS should be reviewed annually to ensure they remain valid in the current environment.

58. CONOPS are signed by both the USG DPKO and the MILAD and as such they cannot be amended without their approval. CONOPS should not be amended without due deliberation and authority, and any change must be driven by a change in circumstances or strategy at higher levels. Minor amendments to a CONOPS may be made by issuing an addendum. The Concept of Operations format is attached at Annex C.

59. **Force Requirements.** Force Requirements serve two main purposes. The first is to provide TCCs with detailed capability requirements for the mission based on the proposed tasks, the second is to provide the operational commander with a list of capabilities around which the CONOPS was planned. Force Requirements are produced in the format at annex D, using the COE Manual (reference G) as a guide to what standard capabilities are required of individual units. Force Requirements are signed by

CMPS and should only be changed with his approval. Once the Force Requirements are signed, it is the responsibility of FGS to commence negotiations with potential TCCs.

60. **Rules of Engagement.** Rules of Engagement are another essential product for every peacekeeping operation and will differ for every peacekeeping operation. They ensure that the use of force by UN armed military personnel is undertaken in accordance with the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council mandate, and the relevant principles of International Law, including the law of Armed Conflict. The ROE also assist the Force Commander to implement the military objectives of the mandate of a UN PKO pursuant to the pertinent Security Council resolutions. OMA planning officers should expect to draft ROE, clear them with the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), and then present them to MILAD for approval prior to deployment of forces, in accordance with reference H.

## **CONCLUSION**

61. The DPKO Military Planning Process guides Military Planning Officers through the planning process for the military component of Peacekeeping Operations. It delivers comprehensive military peacekeeping plans with a high probability of success. The Military Planning Process is subordinate to the Integrated Mission Planning Process and should be guided by it, while being conducted in parallel. Military Planning Officers are not subject matter experts in all areas that effect peacekeeping operations, so information must be sought from other speciality areas within the UN system. The Military Planning Process can be used effectively regardless of how much planning time is available, but will only be effective if the process is followed in sequence and is conducted without bias.

## **ANNEXES**

- A. AOE Information Requirements
- B. Operational Estimate Template
- C. CONOPS Template
- D. Force Requirements Template

**ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT  
INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS**

#	Information Requirements
	<b>Geography</b>
1	<u>Country Location</u> a. Geographic coordinates (latitude, longitude) b. Land boundaries c. Bordering countries d. Total area and length and breath e. Time zone- (GMT +/-)
2	<u>Topography</u> a. Terrain b. Natural hazards c. Elevation extremes d. Land use breakdown e. What/where maps are available
3	<u>Hydrography</u>
4	<u>Oceanography</u> a. Coastline b. Maritime boundaries and claims
5	<u>Climate</u> a. Extent of different climatic zones b. Average annual temperature c. Average annual rainfall d. Identification of wet and dry seasons
6	<u>Weather</u> a. Light b. Daily patterns
7	<u>Natural Resources</u>
8	<u>Wild Life</u> a. Sources of food b. Hazards
	<b>Infrastructure</b>
9	<u>Railway system</u> a. Total length and gauge b. Signalling and control system c. Bridges d. Stations e. Cargo capacity f. Qualified personnel to operate the system g. Status

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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>h. Locomotives</li> <li>i. Rolling stock (carriage)</li> </ul>
10	<u>Roads</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Total length and width</li> <li>b. Status</li> <li>c. Surface</li> <li>d. Bridges</li> <li>e. Traffic capacity (weight and volume)</li> <li>f. Traffic regulations</li> <li>g. Repair Capacity</li> </ul>
11	<u>Waterways, sea, lake and river ports</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Types</li> <li>b. Capacity</li> <li>c. Status</li> <li>d. Ground services and support systems</li> <li>e. Cranage</li> <li>f. Draught (water depth)</li> <li>g. Fuel and oil bunker facilities</li> <li>j. Qualified personnel to operate the system</li> </ul>
12	<u>Airports/Airfields</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Types</li> <li>b. Length</li> <li>c. Surface</li> <li>d. Ground services and support systems (mechanical handling equipment)</li> <li>e. Refuelling facilities</li> <li>f. Approach aids</li> <li>g. Air-traffic control, including long range communications</li> <li>h. Meteorological services</li> <li>i. Crash/fire services</li> <li>j. Repair facilities</li> <li>k. Hangerage</li> <li>l. Current status</li> <li>m. Geographic coordinates</li> <li>n. Airline services available</li> </ul>
13	<u>Communications</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. TV and radio stations: type, capacity, current status and service providers</li> <li>b. Telephone system/s: type, capacity, current status and service providers</li> <li>c. Mobile telephones system/s: type, capacity, current status and service providers</li> <li>d. Internet service providers: capacity, current status</li> <li>e. Satellite coverage</li> </ul>
14	<u>Utilities</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Electricity power generation, transmission and distribution system: type, capacity, current status</li> <li>b. Water supply system: type, capacity, current status</li> </ul>

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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>c. Gas supply system</li> <li>d. Sewage and sanitation services</li> </ul>
15	<u>Medical Infrastructure</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Health care facilities and capabilities</li> <li>b. Emergency capabilities</li> <li>c. MEDEVAC capabilities</li> <li>d. Qualified personnel</li> </ul>
	<b>Economic situation</b>
16	<u>Overall state of the economy</u> (including principle sources of wealth)
17	<u>Degree of exploitation of natural resources and agriculture potential</u>
18	<u>Types major industries</u>
19	<u>Major imports and exports</u>
20	<u>Effect of Sanctions</u>
21	<u>Level of unemployment</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Numbers</li> <li>b. Quality of the work force</li> </ul>
22	<u>Level of international investment and privatisation</u>
23	<u>Banking system</u>
24	<u>Currency used and exchange rate</u>
	<b>Population</b>
25	<u>Total population – composition and disposition of local population by</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Ethnic groups</li> <li>a. Languages</li> <li>b. Religion</li> </ul>
26	<u>For each group</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Population growth / birth / death rates</li> <li>b. Age and gender structure</li> <li>c. Health status <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Life expectancy</li> <li>(2) Endemic diseases</li> </ul> </li> <li>d. Literacy rate and education</li> <li>e. Gender roles</li> <li>f. Traditional, cultural and social institutions</li> </ul>
	<b>Humanitarian situation</b>
27	<u>Humanitarian needs</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Identify venerable groups that will require specific needs</li> <li>b. Food, water</li> <li>c. Sanitation</li> <li>d. Shelter, supplies</li> <li>e. Medical services</li> <li>f. Household kits and farm tools</li> </ul>
28	<u>Possibility for ethnic violence</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Target groups</li> <li>b. Assess violence against women</li> </ul>
29	<u>Recent population movements</u>

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30	<u>Location and number of refugees and IDPs</u> a. Ethnicity b. Age c. Gender structure
31	<u>Extent and nature of landmine / UXO threat</u> a. Locations of the mine fields b. Current local capacity for mine clearance
32	<u>Routes and Infrastructure being used by Humanitarian agencies</u> a. Airports/Seaports b. Internal routes
	<b>The conflict</b>
33	<u>Historical background causes of the conflict and issues at stake</u>
34	<u>Major participants</u> a. Domestic b. Foreign c. Issues at stake for each participant
35	<u>Scope of violence to date</u>
36	<u>Humanitarian consequences</u> a. To date b. Expected
37	<u>Involvement of Humanitarian Agencies and Organisations</u> a. UN agencies and programmes b. Other Humanitarian agencies and NGOs c. UN and other IO s and NGOs operating in the neighbouring countries
	<b>Political System in the Country</b>
38	<u>Nature of the host government</u> a. Government type b. National capital c. Administrative divisions: nature of local government, role of civil society, clans, tribes, community groups, women's groups and degree of ethnic integration and tolerance d. National constitution and laws e. Suffrage (entitlement to vote) f. Participation in regional and international organisations g. International relations h. Response to Peace processes/documents
39	<u>Law and order</u> a. General situation (including degree of politicisation) b. Police (1) Police system (2) Effectiveness (3) Public acceptability c. Judicial system (1) Judges (2) Effectiveness d. Penal system

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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Current status</li> <li>(2) Capacity</li> <li>e. Crimes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Against internationals</li> <li>(2) Against locals</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
40	<u>Media</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Freedom of expression</li> <li>b. Access by population</li> </ul>
41	<u>Major political parties</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Agenda and intent</li> <li>b. Leaders</li> <li>c. Personalities</li> <li>d. Response to peace processes</li> </ul>
42	<u>Political groups</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Agenda and intent</li> <li>b. Leaders</li> </ul>
43	<u>Level of political mobilisation and polarisation</u>
44	<u>History and current state of civil-military relations</u>
45	<u>Nature of human rights practices and treatment of citizens</u>
	<b>Armed Forces and Armed Groups</b>
46	<u>For each force or group</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Political and military objectives</li> <li>b. Strategic and operational centres of gravity</li> <li>c. Total strength</li> <li>d. Dispositions</li> <li>e. Weapons</li> <li>f. Equipment</li> <li>g. Communications</li> <li>h. Table of organisation</li> <li>i. Logistic support</li> <li>j. Strategy and tactic</li> <li>k. Leadership</li> <li>l. Level of mobility</li> <li>m. Level of training</li> <li>n. Information capabilities</li> <li>o. External support (existing and possible)</li> <li>p. Recent and present significant activities</li> <li>q. Popular support (both degree and geographical distribution and extent)</li> <li>r. Degree of political control over the force or group (from internal and external sources)</li> <li>s. Intent towards UN personnel</li> <li>t. Research and development capacity and capabilities</li> </ul>

**OPERATIONAL ESTIMATE TEMPLATE**

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**OPERATIONAL ESTIMATE FOR THE SITUATION IN XXXXXX.....**

REFERENCES: .....

**STRATEGIC SITUATION .....**

**AIM.....**

**KEY FACTORS .....**

THE REGION .....

ADVERSARY GROUPS .....

KEY LEADERS .....

CLIMATE AND WEATHER.....

TOPOGRAPHY .....

TRANSPORTATION .....

INFRASTRUCTURE.....

DEMOGRAPHY .....

**UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATION .....**

PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS .....

PROPOSED OBJECTIVES .....

DEVELOPMENT OF OPTIONS .....

METHODOLOGY.....

PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION .....

DISCLAIMER .....

**ANNEX A: BACKGROUND TO THE CURRENT SITUATION IN XXXXX.....**

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND .....

EARLIER UN PEACE MISSIONS (IF APPLICABLE).....

ATTEMPTS AT A SUSTAINABLE PEACE PROCESS.....

NATIONAL RECONCILIATION EFFORTS.....

ESCALATION OF CONFLICT .....

INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL PEACE INITIATIVES.....

SECURITY SITUATION .....

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS TEMPLATE

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Copy No \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_ copies  
DPKO/MD (issuing authority)  
New York, xxXXXXxx (date of  
signature)

**MILITARY CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR (UNXXX)**

**References:** This is a list of pertinent documents that provide a foundation for the CONOPS; normally, references will be made in ascending chronological order.

- a) (peace agreements)
- b) (SG's reports)
- c) (Security Council resolutions)
- d) (DPKO mission specific guidance)
- e) (Logistic Support Concept)
- f) (Police CONOPS)
- g) (TCC guidelines)
- h) (strategic estimates)
- i) (operational estimates)
- j) (any other relevant documents)

**Review:**

This paragraph states when the CONOPS should be reviewed, usually annually or at the renewal of the mandate, whichever is the earlier.

**Force organization:**

Force Headquarters

HQ Company  
Engineer Company  
Transport Company  
etc.

Sector

Infantry Battalion  
Infantry Battalion  
Etc.

Sector

Infantry Battalion  
Infantry Battalion

Etc.

See Annex C - Troop to Task

**1. Situation:**

**a. Background:**

This section should provide a brief synopsis of the conflict, with a brief history of UN involvement if any. It should cover measures that have been undertaken by the international community to address the conflict. It should refer to ceasefire or comprehensive peace agreements that have led/are leading to the deployment of UN forces. This sub-paragraph could be approximately one page in length and divided in sub-sub-paragraphs, and should be derived from the strategic assessment. If required, a more comprehensive document on the background of the crisis can be attached as an annex. A revised CONOPS should refer to the main developments since the previous CONOPS was issued.

Annex A - Background to the crisis

**b. Current Situation:**

This sub-paragraph should provide a broad description of the security situation on the ground concerning the parties to the conflict, the humanitarian situation and any external forces in the country.

**c. Threat Assessment:**

A broad sub-paragraph on the parties, including militia and spoiler groups, their intent, capabilities, and sources of support. Mention should also be made of any external actors including neighbouring countries and their specific role in the crisis. The most likely and most dangerous courses of actions of the parties as they affect the UN military mission should be analysed. A detailed threat assessment could be attached as an annex.

Annex B - Threat Assessment

**2. Planning Assumptions:**

The key military assumptions which directly impact on the planning process should be listed in order to provide the Force Commander with the basis for the logic of the CONOPS.

**3. Strategic Objectives:**

This paragraph states the strategic political objectives of the mission. It should refer to relevant SC reports, resolutions and mandates pertaining to the conflict and must refer to the specific mandate authorizing the UN mission. The paragraph should then state the mandated tasks as outlined in the SC resolution authorizing the UN mission that must be achieved to support the high political strategy.

**4. Mission Statement:**

The military mission to the Force Commander describes the role of the military component of the mission in achieving the strategic objectives of the UN mission. The military mission statement should be concise and end with a unifying purpose. The paragraph must not be sub-paragraphed.

**5. Strategic Endstate:**

This is a description of the Mission's endstate which defines the environment that would indicate successful completion of the military mission.

**6. Execution:**

**a. Intent:**

This should give a description of the USG's and MILAD's intent on the ways to achieve the military mission and the UN mission's strategic endstate.

**b. Concept:**

This sub-paragraph explains how military operations will be conducted in support of the UN mission. It should provide an outline description of the pattern of military operations, which should be well synchronised and integrated with the UN Mission's overall plan and all other UN Mission components (Support, Police, etc.). It should highlight all the phases of the mission, from initial deployment and force build-up, to consolidation, drawdown and withdrawal. It is advisable that the most immediate phases be developed in more detail, whereas later phases will be outlined and detailed in subsequent revised CONOPS. The military main effort for each phase should be stated and where identifiable, an endstate provided. A graphic may be used to illustrate the concept.

Annex D - Concept Graphic

**c. Tasks:**

This paragraph assigns specific tasks to manoeuvre units, including UNMOs and reserves at every level, which are either not included in the overall mandated tasks, or whose importance requires to be highlighted.

**d. Coordinating Instructions:**

This paragraph includes instructions applicable to two or more elements of the force organization, which require specific coordination measures. Other information should also be included, such as reporting instructions, anticipated time of execution and when the CONOPS becomes effective for planning and/or execution.

**7. Administration and Logistics:**

This paragraph should include the summary of the concept of logistic support, as prepared by the Office of Mission Support, which should be well synchronised with the military, police and other plans. The logistic support concept should be identified in the initial references, as well as the TCC guidelines issued for the specific mission.

**8. (Other paragraphs):**

(Other paragraphs can be included, as required. However, it should be taken into consideration those issues such as Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, Gender Balance, etc., would be better addressed through the Force Commander's Directive)

**9. Command and Control:**

This paragraph should follow DPKO guidelines on the "Command and Control of the Military Component in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations". The chain of command (Force Headquarters, Division, Sector and battalion headquarters) are described as well as the identification of any liaison officers present in neighbouring missions. The span of command and interface with neighbouring missions or other in-place non-UN forces should be covered (e.g. UNOCI with LICORNE). This section should normally be supplemented with a diagram outlining the command and control arrangements provided as an annex.

Annex E - Force and FHQ structures

**10. Acknowledgement:**

The Force Commander is to formally acknowledge the receipt of the CONOPS and is to produce his/her Operation Order (OPORD), which is to be endorsed by the SRSG. The FC must submit to the MILAD copies of all subsequent OPORDs, Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs) and other orders issued or related to the military component of the UN mission.

(Signatures)

Full Name  
Military Adviser  
Department of Peacekeeping Operations

(date)

Full name  
Under-Secretary General for  
Peacekeeping Operations

(date)

**Annexes:** (the following annexes, and others as required, may be included):

Annex A - Background of the crisis

Annex B - Threat Assessment

**Annex C to  
DPKO Military Planning Process  
Dated November 09**

Annex C - Troop to Task  
Annex D - Concept Graphic  
Annex E - Force and FHQ structures  
Annex F - Operation timelines

<b><u>Distribution List:</u></b>	<b>Copy</b>
<b>No.</b>	
(The following copies, and other as required, may be issued)	
<u>External Action:</u>	
- Force Commander UNXXX	1 of ...
<u>External Info:</u>	
- Special Representative of the Secretary-General for UNXXX	2 of...
- Police Commissioner UNXXX	3
- SRSG for UNXXX (neighboring UN mission)	4
- SRSG for UNXXX (neighboring UN mission)	5
<u>Internal:</u>	
- Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations	6
- Assistant-Secretary General for the Office of Operations	7
- Assistant-Secretary General for the Office of Mission Support	8
- Military Adviser	9
- Police Adviser	10
- Current Military Operations Service	11
- Force Generation Service	12
- Training and Evaluation Service	13
- Military Planning Service	14 to 16

## **FORCE REQUIREMENTS TEMPLATE**

*These Force Requirements enumerate the capabilities that are required for optimizing the unit's efficiency in the conduct of operations as mandated for the Mission. The Concepts of Operations [CONOPs] and any future adjustments to the CONOPs may place additional and more specific requirements on the unit. This should be noted in relations to the MOUs that will be negotiated based on the capabilities provided in this document. The provisions in such MOUs shall by no means supersede the capabilities sought in this document.*

### **UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN XXXXXX FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR XXXXXXXXXX**

#### **References**

- A. Generic Guidelines for Troop Contributing Countries Deploying Military Units to United Nations Peacekeeping Missions – March 2008.
- B. Authority, Command and Control in UN Peacekeeping Operations dated 15 February 2008.
- C. The United Nations Manual for Contingent Owned Equipment.
- D. The Military Strategic Concept of Operations (CONOPS) dated XX XX XXXX.
- E. Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the Military Component of XXXX dated XXXX.

#### **1. Situation**

- 1.1 Brief paragraph on the current military situation

#### **2. General Concept**

##### **2.1 Outline of Concept of Operations.**

- 2.1.1 Brief summary of the whole military CONOPS
- 2.1.2 Brief paragraph on how this unit will integrate into the overall CONOPS

##### **2.2 Main Effort.**

- 2.2.1 Taken from CONOPS

##### **2.3 End State**

- 2.3.1 Taken from CONOPS

#### **3. Mission**

Taken from CONOPS

#### **4. Requirements**

##### **4.1 Organization.**

- 4.1.1 Describe how this unit fits into the PKO organization

##### **4.2 Tasks.**

- 4.2.1 list of military tasks in priority order from essential to be prepared tasks for this unit
- 4.3 Special Requirements.**
  - 4.3.1 List special requirements for this unit in terms of capabilities rather than specialist equipment unless that equipment it is essential for mission success.
- 4.4 Major Equipment (See Table).**
  - 4.4.1 List in a table the major equipments that relate to a specific capability required for this unit.
  - 4.4.2 Add notes if needed.
- 5. Logistic and Support Equipment**
  - 5.1 Administration.**
    - 5.1.1 Administration and discipline remain national responsibilities.
  - 5.2 Logistics.**
    - 5.2.1 Outline of all log items appropriate to this unit and what organic logistics capability this unit requires (if any).
  - 5.3 Medical.**
    - 5.3.1 Detail a specific requirement for Level 1 medical within this unit (if required), or the nearest location/unit that will have Level 1 facilities.
    - 5.3.2 Level II located at
    - 5.3.3 Level III located at
    - 5.3.4 Level IV located at
    - 5.3.5 Medevac plan
- 6. Command and Control**
  - 6.1 Force Commander.**
    - 6.1.1 Explain the FC role – lift from C2 Directive
  - 6.2 Unit Commander.**
    - 6.2.1 Detail the unit commander’s C2 relationship to FC (or CAO if log unit) as well as subordinates (if any).
  - 6.3 Reporting Requirements.**
    - 6.3.1 List any specific reporting requirements.

**Annex D to  
DPKO Military Planning Process  
Dated November 09**

***Full Name***  
*Chief Military Planning Service*  
*Department of Peacekeeping Operations*

*(date)*